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Group Representation by Attorneys as
Misconduct
Richard M. Markus*
N 1964 THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT plunged into the
debate over group legal services, undaunted by volleys and
thunder from the organized bar. In Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia,' the Court enjoined the State of Virginia
from interfering with a union program of referring its members
to selected attorneys as counsel in F. E. L. A. cases. By that
ruling, the Court has apparently overridden the effect of pre-
viously accepted Canons of Ethics, on the ground that their ap-
plication infringes on constitutionally protected rights. Probably
no single judicial decision and no extra-judicial event within the
past several decades has so vigorously shaken conservative inter-
preters of professional legal ethics. The decision continues to be
the subject of extensive discussion and debate by the bar asso-
ciations,2 and its full significance and effect may not be under-
stood for many years.
At the heart of this controversy is a dispute that has been
raging with increasing vigor over the propriety of arrangements
by associations or organizations with counsel to assist or repre-
sent their members. The same socio-economic pressures which
have called greater attention to that issue for lawyers have like-
wise affected other professional and quasi-professional activities.
Numerous medical clinics have been created which will contrac-
tually provide professional medical services to the members of a
union or other organization.3 Individual physicians are retained
by employers to treat their employees and by unions to treat
* Of the law firm of Sindell, Sindell, Bourne & Markus of Cleveland; B.S.,
Northwestern Univ.; LL.B., Harvard Univ.; Asst. Prof., Cleveland-Marshall
Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 84 S. Ct. 1113, 377 U. S. 1, 12 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1964). The American Bar
Association filed a strongly worded brief as amicus curiae in support of the
decision below which the Court reversed.
2 For example, the decision was the subject of scheduled meetings at the
1964 national conventions of both the American Bar Association and the
American Trial Lawyers Association. See Program, A. B. A. 87th Annual
Meeting, p. 29 (1964); Program, 18th Annual Convention N. A. C. C. A. Bar
Association, p. 14 (1964).
3 See Medical Administration Service, Inc., Benefits of Group Practice(1949); Medical Administration Service, Inc., Prepayment Plans for Med-
ical Care; Julius Rosenwald Fund, New Plans of Medical Service (1936).
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their members.4 Hospital accommodations are commonly paid
for by insurance programs whose premiums are a part of group
organizational dues or employers fringe benefits.5 Associations
have been created to provide funeral services to their members.6
Trade associations routinely employ public relations personnel,
engineers, and scientifically trained researchers, all of whom are
intended directly or indirectly to assist the associations' mem-
bers.
However, legal services have been less available on a group
basis, principally because of resistance by the organized bar.
That resistance is incorporated in part in national and local Can-
ons of Ethics. Nevertheless, some group legal undertakings are
approved by lawyers and non-lawyers alike as socially desirable.
The liability insurance policy serves as a means by which the
individual obtains specified legal services together with the in-
demnity rights afforded by the insuring contract.7 Some large
commercial concerns have chosen to purchase insuring contracts
under which the insurer provides adjusting services and legal
counsel without any indemnity provision, or under terms by
which the entire settlement or judgment is charged back to the
insured. These "retrospective risk" type policies are intended to
supply adjusting services and professional legal assistance for the
policyholder, whose premium rate may be fixed or vary with the
settlements or judgments paid by him.8 In some foreign coun-
4 See Stem, Medicine In Industry, 160-90 (1946).
5 For an understanding of the previous position of the medical profession,
see A. M. A. Bureau of Medical Economics, Group Hospitalization (1937);
A. M. A., Bureau of Medical Economics, A Critical Analysis of Sickness
Insurance (1934). Between 1940 and 1960, the number of people in the
United States with insurance protection for hospital care increased from
12,312,000 to 131,962,000. The percentage having some form of health insur-
ance protection increased in that period from approximately 10% to ap-
proximately 73%. See Angell, Health Insurance, 11-12 (1963).
6 These plans have existed for many years but have received increased im-
petus from recent publicity of high funeral expenses.
7 For terms of standard automobile liability insurance policies, see 1 Ris-
jord-Austin, Automobile Liability Ins. Cases (loose leaf service), pp. 1-
56,0000. In 1963, automobile bodily injury liability premiums reached
$2,194,000,000. See Best's Insurance Reports, p. xi (1964). Workmen's Com-
pensation liability premiums in that year were $1,164,000,000. Ibid. In ad-
dition substantial insurance was written for products liability, professional
liability (medical, legal, etc.), aircraft liability, general liability (often as
part of a "homeowners" policy), construction and malfeasance bonds, and
numerous other types of liability situations. See The Spectator, Coverage
and Forms (1953).
8 See, e.g., The Spectator, Coverage and Forms, 187-92 (1953).
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GROUP REPRESENTATION BY ATTORNEYS
tries, group legal services have become commonplace,9 but in the
United States most other types of group legal retainers have
been subjected to attacks of varying intensity by local bar asso-
ciations.
Proponents of group representation point to at least four
justifications: (a) the need, particularly by those without sub-
stantial financial resources, to budget the cost of legal services
over an extended period of time, (b) the desirability for many
to share the risk of events requiring legal services, (c) the power
of a group to obtain such services more economically by reason
of a better bargaining position and the promise of continuing
business, and (d) the ability of a group spokesman to make a
more judicious choice among available counsel. Those who op-
pose further expansion of group legal services cite the following
dangers: (a) development of commercialism in the practice of
law with resulting lowering of prestige and professional stand-
ards, (b) increased ability of non-legal organizations to engage
in the unauthorized practice of law, (c) greater opportunity for
unscrupulous counsel to solicit business through such groups,
and (d) loss of a direct professional relationship between attor-
ney and client arising from increased authority of the inter-
mediary group.
This article is intended to consider the future of group re-
tainers in light of these conflicting views. Attention will first be
given to the "Canons of Professional Ethics" 10 which affect this
subject and the judicial decisions interpreting them. Next, an
attempt will be made to evaluate the effect of the Supreme Court
Brotherhood case, and other related decisions, upon the Canons.
Finally, an effort will be made to anticipate the prospects of
group legal service with a view towards implementing or modi-
fying present standards.
The Canons of Ethics
The Canons of Ethics were originally adopted by the Amer-
ican Bar Association in 1908; they have been supplemented and
9 See Jacoby, Legal Aid to the Poor, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 940 (1940); Feather,
The Essence of Trade Unionism, 42-43 (1963).
10 While the most familiar "Canons" are those adopted by the American
Bar Association and approved by state bar associations, the state bar au-
thorities have sometimes paraphrased, modified, and supplemented those
rules. The A. B. A. Canons are reprinted annually at HI Martindale-
Hubbell Law Directory, Prefatory Section.
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amended in certain particulars on ten subsequent occasions. 1
Those which most directly affect the subject at hand include
Canon 27 (Advertising, Direct or Indirect) ,12 Canon 28 (Stirring
Up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents),13 Canon 35 (Inter-
11 The first 32 Canons were adopted in 1908. Canons 33 through 45 were
adopted in 1928. Subsequent meetings adopted Canon 46 (1933) and Canon
47 (1937). Amendments were made to Canon 7 (1937), Canon 11 (1933 and
1937), Canon 12 (1937), Canon 13 (1933), Canon 27 (1937, 1940, 1942, 1943,
and 1951), Canon 28 (1928), Canon 31 (1937), Canon 33 (1937), Canon 34
(1933 and 1937), Canon 35 (1933), Canon 37 (1937), Canon 39 (1937), Canon
43 (1933, 1937, and 1942), and Canon 46 (1956). This year a new committee
was appointed to consider further amendments or additions. See 9 Ameri-
can Bar News, No. 10, pp. 1-2 (1964).
12 "27. Advertising, Direct or Indirect.
"It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars,
advertisements, through touters, or by personal communications or inter-
views not warranted by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for pro-
fessional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments,
or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, offend the traditions and
lower the tone of our profession and are reprehensible; but the customary
use of simple professional cards is not improper.
"Publication in reputable law lists in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by these canons of brief biographical and
informative data is permissible. Such data must not be misleading and may
include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his profes-
sional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches
of the profession practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the
Bar; schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and other educa-
tional distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal au-
thorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and offices in bar associa-
tions and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fra-
ternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of cli-
ents regularly represented. A certificate of compliance with the Rules and
Standards issued by the Special Committee on Law Lists may be treated as
evidence that such list is reputable."
'3 "28. Stirring up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents
"It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a law-
suit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it
his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofes-
sional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up
defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be
employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seek-
ing out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other
grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents
or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to
remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches
or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly
advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant
or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the
profession devolves upon every member of the Bar, having knowledge of
such practices upon the part of any practitioner, immediately to inform
thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred."
Jan., 1965
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss1/3
GROUP REPRESENTATION BY ATTORNEYS 5
mediaries),14 Canon 40 (Newspapers),15 and Canon 47 (Aiding
the Unauthorized Practice of Law).16 It is feared by some that
group legal representation might also come into conflict with
Canon 6 (Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests) 17 Canon
12 (Fixing the Amount of the Fee),1s Canon 24 (Right of Law-
14 "35. Intermediaries
"The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or ex-
ploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between
client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are indi-
vidual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his
duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his
client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the
client. Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent are not deemed
such intermediaries.
"A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an
association, club or trade organization, to render legal services in any mat-
ter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employ-
ment should not include the rendering of legal services to the members of
such an organization in respect to their individual affairs."
15 "40. Newspapers
"A lawyer may with propriety write articles for publications in which
he gives information upon the law; but he should not accept employment
from such publications to advise inquirers in respect to their individual
rights."
16 "Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law
"No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be
used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any
lay agency, personal or corporate."
17 "6. Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests
"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the
client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest
in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in
the selection of counsel.
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by ex-
press consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty
to another client requires him to oppose.
"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not
to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance
of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any
interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed."
18 "12. Fixing the Amount of the Fee
"In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges which overestimate their
advice and services, as well as those which undervalue them. A client's
ability to pay cannot justify a charge in excess of the value of the service,
though his poverty may require a less charge, or even none at all. The
reasonable requests of brother lawyers, and of their widows and orphans
without ample means, should receive special and kindly consideration.
"In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to consider: (1) the
time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether
the acceptance of employment in the particular case will preclude the law-
yer's appearance for others in cases likely to arise out of the transaction,
and in which there is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be
(Continued on next page)
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yer to Control the Incidents of the Trial),19 and Canon 31 (Re-
sponsibility for Litigation).20 Formal opinions by the American
Bar Association Professional Ethics Committee2 ' have applied
these Canons to outlaw numerous group representation situa-
tions. Thus, an automobile club's "legal department" cannot
properly furnish legal services with respect to personal injury
claims by or against club members. 22 An attorney may not ac-
cept referrals from the trust department of a bank which are
conditioned on the understanding that the referring bank will
be designated as executor or trustee for the estate or trust in-
(Continued from preceding page)
employed, or will involve the loss of other employment while employed in
the particular case or antagonisms with other clients; (3) the customary
charges of the Bar for similar services; (4) the amount involved in the
controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (5)
the contingency or the certainty of the compensation; and (6) the character
of the employment, whether casual or for an established and constant cli-
ent. No one of these considerations in itself is controlling. They are mere
guides in ascertaining the real value of the service.
"In determining the customary charges of the Bar for similar services,
it is proper for a lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted
by a Bar Association, but no lawyer should permit himself to be controlled
thereby or follow it as his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee.
"In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a
branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting
trade."
19 "24. Right of Lawyer to Control the Incidents of the Trial
"As to incidental matters pending the trial, not affecting the merits of
the cause, or working substantial prejudice to the rights of the client, such
as forcing the opposite lawyer to trial when he is under affliction or be-
reavement; forcing the trial on a particular day to the injury of the oppo-
site lawyer when no harm will result from a trial at a different time; agree-
ing to an extension of time for signing a bill of exceptions, cross-interroga-
tories and the like, the lawyer must be allowed to judge. In such matters
no client has a right to demand that his counsel shall be illiberal, or that
he do anything therein repugnant to his own sense of honor and propriety."
20 "31. Responsibility for Litigation
"No lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
employment. Every lawyer upon his own responsibility must decide what
employment he will accept as counsel, what causes he will bring into Court
for plaintiffs, what cases he will contest in Court for defendants. The re-
sponsibility for advising questionable transactions, for bringing questionable
suits, for urging questionable defenses, is the lawyer's responsibility. He
cannot escape it by urging as an excuse that he is only following his client's
instructions."
21 The Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances is a standing com-
mittee of the A. B. A. which issues both "formal" and "informal" opinions.
The most recent compilation of formal opinions was published in 1957. In-
formal opinions and later formal opinions are published in the monthly
issues of the American Bar Association Journal.
22 See A. B. A. Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinions,
No. 8 (1957).
Jan., 1965
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volved.23 Nor may an attorney assist a state bankers' association
to publish a "legal" bulletin which gives advice in response to
written questions submitted by member banks and identifies the
attorney supplying the answer. 24 He may not contribute to the
legal advice column of a trade association publication which an-
swers individual members' problems.25 Nor may he offer his
services gratuitously to an impecunious labor union with the
hope that he may receive employment from the members of the
union.
26
Local bar associations have reached similar conclusions.
Thus, the Bar Association of the City of New York challenged
a retainer agreement for the general counsel of a tenants' mem-
bership corporation under which he would represent members
in proceedings by landlords.2 7 The same bar association con-
cluded that an attorney may not by way of retainer represent
members of a hair dressers' organization in defending them
against suits by their customers. 28 The same Bar held that an
attorney may not conclude an arrangement with a licensed
nurses' organization which paid him ten dollars per year per
member, whereby each member was entitled to consult with him
on any legal problem. 29 Again, that association concluded that
the Canons were violated by an attorney who donated services
to a postal employees' union which provided free legal service to
its members and published the availability of their selected coun-
sel.3 0 The New York County Lawyers' Association determined
that an attorney employed by a teachers' association may repre-
sent the individual members on test cases affecting the general
23 See id. at No. 122.
24 See id. at No. 98.
25 See id. at No. 162.
26 See id. at No. 169. The extent of publicity afforded the counsel is appar-
ently of great significance in determining the propriety of his association
with the group. See id. at Nos. 273 and 285. While counsel for a corporation
may properly be identified in the company's annual report to shareholders,
he usually may not be so identified on the letterhead of communications to
the public or bulletins to stockholders. See id. at No. 285.
27 See Association of the Bar of New York, Opinion No. 714 (1948). Cf.
Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n., 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N. E.
577 (1931). But see New York County Lawyers' Ass'n. Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics, Opinion No. 261 (1928), (attorney may represent group of
landlords to defend against injury claims of tenants).
28 See Association of the Bar of New York, Opinion No. 730 (1949).
29 See Id., Opinion No. 753 (1950).
30 See Id., Opinion No. 763 (1951).
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group but may not otherwise act for the members without
charge or at nominal rates, even though the problem involved
the professional status of the individual teacher-member. 31
In general, most state courts have reached similar conclu-
sions with regard to group legal services, although some have
been slightly more liberal and others been hesitant to invoke
harsh disciplinary measures against attorneys participating in
such programs. For example, Illinois, Ohio, and Rhode Island
courts have disapproved of corporate automobile clubs who fur-
nished specific legal services to their members. 32 Massachusetts
has allowed such an organization to pay for the services of attor-
neys selected by the members directly,33 and the District of Co-
lumbia has allowed such an organization to negotiate its mem-
bers' claims through lay-employees so long as no legal advice
was involved.34
Various states have objected to agreements between labor
unions and attorneys under which the union recommended a
particular attorney to its members. The Ohio Supreme Court
reviewed a written agreement between attorneys and a truck
drivers' local union.3 5 Under its terms the attorneys received a
fee from the union and consented to assist and represent the
union members in simple workmen's compensation proceedings.
They further agreed to represent members who wished to retain
them in more complex compensation proceedings, at a contingent
fee below the ordinary rate. The court concluded that the con-
tract and its communication to the membership had the purpose
and effect of "soliciting professional employment," 36 and there-
by "did breed litigation." 3T The attorneys were therefore sus-
pended indefinitely from the practice of law.
31 See New York County Lawyers' Ass'n., Committee on Professional
Ethics, Opinion No. 363 (1941).
32 Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N. E. 1 (1935);
Goodman v. Motorists Alliance, 29 Ohio N. P. N. S. 31 (1931); Dworken v.
Cleveland Auto. Club, 29 Ohio N. P. N. S. 667 (1931); Rhode Island Bar
Ass'n. v. Automobile Service Ass'n., 55 R. I. 122, 179 Atl. 139 (1935). See
Annotation, 106 A. L. R. 548, Cf. Land Title Abs. & T. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N. E. 650 (1934).
33 In Re Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 3 N. E. 2d 749 (1936); but cf. In Re
Maclub of America, 295 Mass. 45, 3 N. E. 2d 272 (1936).
34 American Automobile Ass'n. v. Merrick, 117 F. 2d 23 (D. C. Cir. 1940).
85 Cleveland Bar Ass'n. v. Fleck, 172 Ohio St. 467, 178 N. E. 2d 782 (1961),
certiorari denied, 369 U. S. 861 (1962).
36 Id. at 172 Ohio St. 470, 178 N. E. 2d 785 (Compare Canon 27, supra n. 12).
37 Id. at 172 Ohio St. 472, 178 N. E. 2d 785 (Compare Canon 28, supra n. 13).
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The plan which has received the greatest attention from the
courts was the one organized by the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen. In some instances, the Brotherhood received a por-
tion of fees charged by attorneys, purportedly to assist the union
in maintaining its legal aid department. At certain times, the
Brotherhood supplied investigators to assist designated counsel
in preparing the cases of their members. However, the heart of
the Brotherhood program has always been the selection of "re-
gional counsel" who were recommended to the membership as
particularly able in the handling of F. E. L. A. cases.38 The atti-
tudes of the courts of various states toward this program have
been far from uniform.
The propriety of the Brotherhood plan has been considered
by the courts of Missouri, Tennessee, New York, Illinois, Cali-
fornia and Ohio. The plan apparently started in 1930. By 1933
it was already the subject of judicial consideration by an inter-
mediate Ohio appellate court. 39 Two judges of that court found
that the plan involved solicitation of business by and for the
affiliated attorneys.40 However, the third member of that court
considered that the plan was "meritorious and worthy," that it
is "not tainted with unlawful or unethical elements," and "that
38 When the Brotherhood received compensation it took the varied forms
of (a) a division of fees, (b) a portion of fees as reimbursement for investi-
gative services, and (c) quantum meruit payment for investigation. The
adequacy of selected counsel is subject to criticism on the basis that only
sixteen are selected for the entire United States. Either such counsel would
attempt to practice in different jurisdictions, despite different adjective
legal rules and distance barriers, or they would select local counsel to han-
dle the matter. In either event, the union has not itself designated appro-
priate local counsel.
39 Petition of the Committee on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar Ass'n., 15
Ohio L. Abs. 106 (1933).
40 See id. at 108: "The results of this plan are these: The Legal Aid De-
partment by publication in the Brotherhood Journal, by circulating the
locals, by personal representations and by about all the methods known,
is constantly soliciting legal business for the respondent firm. That firm in
turn, knowing exactly how its business is being solicited for it impliedly
assents to such solicitation and because it expects to get a large volume of
business fixes an ironclad fifteen percent contingent fee, plus a further five
percent charge to be collected by it and paid over to the soliciting agency.
It is the sheerest sophistry to say that under these circumstances the re-
spondent is not itself soliciting. It is slight compliment to the perspicacity
of others to assume that so flimsy a fabric can effectively disguise the real
character of the arrangement. Even the old women that sit on the commit-
tee of Legal Ethics of the American Bar Association as one of the respond-
ent firms graphically puts it (p. 553), ought not be deceived by such a de-
vice."
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it is not unlawful or unethical for counsel to accept the employ-
ment."
At approximately the same time the plan was scrutinized by
an intermediate appellate court in Illinois and a federal district
court in New York. The Illinois court found "that the purpose
of the Brotherhood is a worthy one, planned to prevent frauds
upon its members and to aid them in the assertion of their legal
rights .... ," 41 In that case, however, the court was only indi-
rectly concerned with principles of legal ethics. The attorney
there sought to recover his fee from a railroad that had inter-
fered with his representation of the railroad employee. The rail-
road claimed in defense that the attorney had been retained as
a result of the Brotherhood plan and was therefore acting un-
ethically in accepting the case. Thus, that court's apparent ap-
proval of the plan was only dictum to its determination in favor
of the attorney's claim for fees. A recent decision in Ohio like-
wise upheld the claim for fees under these circumstances with-
out passing upon the propriety of the Brotherhood plan as a
source of representation. 42 In New York, the federal district
court evaluated the plan.43 That court found "that the organiza-
tion was performing a valuable service for its members," but
that the attorneys who cooperated with the plan were in viola-
tion of the Canons of Ethics and subject to censure. 44
In due course, the plan was discussed by the courts of last
resort in Missouri, California, Illinois, and Ohio. The highest
courts of Missouri and California both found that attorneys par-
ticipating in the Brotherhood program were violating the rules
41 Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. R., 268 fI. App. 364 (1932).
42 Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, T. & I. R. R., 226 F. Supp.
345 (S. D. Ohio 1964).
43 In Re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E. D. N. Y. 1933); Doughty v. Grills, 37
Tenn. App. 63, 260 S. W. 2d 379 (1952). Contra, Reynolds v. Gulf M. 0. &
T. P. Ry., No. 772 (unreported) (E. D. Tenn. 1946): "'My idea is that there
is no violation of professional ethics by an arrangement whereby the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen maintains a Legal Aid Department for
the optional use of its members or families of deceased members. This is
in accord with recognized practices of other organizations and would seem
to be a proper method of obtaining qualified legal aid in prosecuting the
claims of the members or families of deceased members. The members or
families of deceased members do not have to take the services. I can see
nothing improper in any lawyer being generally retained to accept employ-
ment under these conditions.'"
44 See In Re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465, at 466 (E. D. N. Y. 1933). Cf. North
Carolina ex rel. McLean v. Hice (unreported) (Buncombe, N. C. Super. Ct.).
Jan., 1965
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of professional ethics.45 At the same time, the uncertainty of
these decisions is emphasized by strong dissenting views and the
refusal to discipline the attorneys involved so long as they did
not continue to cooperate with the program. 46 Thus, while the
Supreme Court of California found that the attorneys cooper-
ating with the plan were guilty of solicitation, two dissenting
justices believed that there was no breach of ethics and that the
concept of group legal service was socially desirable. 47
The Illinois Supreme Court apparently approved of the sub-
stance of the Brotherhood plan as recently as 1958.48 Refusing to
discipline the attorneys, the court expressly stated that the Broth-
erhood could properly advise its members as to the wisdom of
obtaining counsel and the names of such counsel who have the
capacity to handle such claims successfully. The Illinois court did
object to payments by counsel to the union, which were then a
regular part of the Brotherhood program. By contrast, the high-
est court of Ohio unanimously voted to suspend an attorney from
practice for cooperating with the Brotherhood program.49
A review of these decisions indicates that most of the judges
who condemned the Brotherhood referral plan found it to involve
solicitation, advertising, and furtherance of the union's unauthor-
ized practice of law. But some of these same judges expressed
qualified approval of the group legal service concept, while ruling
that the particular program before them presented unreasonable
45 Hulse v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 340 S. W. 2d 400 (Mo. 1960);
Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P. 2d 508 (1950).
See also Young v. Gulf, M. & 0. Ry., No. 3957 (unreported) (E. D. Mo.
1946).
46 In the Hulse case, supra n. 45, the Missouri court dismissed contempt
proceedings against the counsel on their representation that they would de-
sist from the practices found to be objectionable. In the Hildebrand case,
supra n. 45, the California court overruled the commissioners' recommenda-
tion of suspension for four years "in view of the somewhat divergent im-
plications found in the cited cases" and the absence of any prior California
decision on the issue.
47 Justice Carter and Justice Traynor each wrote extended dissenting
opinions. See Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 518, 519,
225 P. 2d 508, 522, 523 (1950).
48 In Re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N. E. 2d 163
(1958). The decision presents ethical guidelines for the Brotherhood and
its counsel in effecting the plan. The union's employees may not carry
legal retainer contracts or copies of settlement checks. Counsel may not
compensate the Brotherhood or its officials, and the Brotherhood may not
fix fees for the counsel. The attorney-client relationship must remain indi-
vidual and personal.
49 Columbus Bar Ass'n. v. Potts, 175 Ohio St. 101, 191 N. E. 2d 728 (1963).
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abuses of that concept. 0 The members of the judiciary who de-
nied the propriety of the Brotherhood plan uniformly relied upon
the letter (if not the spirit) of the written canons. Those who de-
fended the plan made little effort to justify the plan within the
strict framework of the accepted canons, but rather approached
the subject from a broader and more general view of ethics.51
The Federal Constitution
It is only within the last ten years that legal ethics and attor-
ney disciplinary proceedings have been found to involve federal
constitutional questions. In 1957 the Supreme Court ruled that
the right to practice law is a constitutionally protected property
right so that a state could not exclude a person from that practice
in a manner or for reasons that violated the due process clause or
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 52
Then, approximately one year before the Brotherhood decision,
the Court overruled a Florida court that sought to regulate pro-
fessional practice on the ground that the Florida ruling had failed
to yield to the supremacy of federal law. In that case, the state
court had prohibited persons not licensed to practice law within
its boundaries or elsewhere from representing clients on matters
before the federal Patent Office and from holding themselves out
as patent counsel for that purpose. Finding that these persons
were authorized to so act by the federal Patent Office, the United
States Supreme Court held that Florida had no power to inter-
fere.5
3
The immediate forerunner to the Brotherhood case was the
decision in N. A. A. C. P. v. Button.5 4 In the N. A. A. C. P. case,
Virginia had enjoined the association from employing counsel to
represent its own members and others on civil rights matters. The
N. A. A. C. P. had followed a regular program of recommending
legal proceedings and providing counsel for proceedings on civil
rights matters in which the association had an interest. Virginia
found that this activity constituted solicitation, the unauthorized
50 Such an approach may be the most fruitful in future matters in view of
the Supreme Court Brotherhood decision; supra n. 1.
51 See, e.g., opinions of Justice Carter and Justice Traynor, cited supra
n. 47.
52 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U. S. 232
(1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U. S. 252 (1957).
53 Sperry v. State ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U. S. 379 (1963).
54 371 U. S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963).
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practice of law, and the involvement of intermediaries.55 In re-
versing the Virginia court's order, the Supreme Court seemingly
placed considerable emphasis on the fact that this procedure was
necessary to protect constitutionally guaranteed rights of Vir-
ginians who would otherwise have difficulty in obtaining counsel.
The court asserted that counsel were not always readily available
to represent the civil rights cause in Virignia courts, so that these
somewhat unpopular causes were not truly solicited.56 In the so-
cial context of the N. A. A. C. P. activities, the organization was
found to be seeking lawful objectives of equality before the law
rather than stirring up litigation. The majority opinion was care-
ful to point out that group legal services generally were not being
judged by the court. 57 Indeed, a footnote to this portion of the
opinion refers specifically to the plan of the Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen, and acknowledges the divided reaction to that
plan in the state courts.
In each case the court said: 58
Although the petitioner has amply shown that its activities
fall within the First Amendment's protections, the State has
failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the
form of substantive evils flowing from petitioners' activities,
55 The Virginia court found that the N. A. A. C. P. program violated crim-
inal statutes against solicitation or the canons of ethics or both. The lan-
guage of the statute (enacted in 1956) and the Virginia version of the can-
ons are reprinted in the Supreme Court opinion at 371 U. S. 423-27.
56 See id. at 443-44: "Resort to the courts to seek vindication of constitu-
tional rights is a different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avari-
cious use of the legal process for purely private gain. Lawsuits attacking
racial discrimination, at least in Virginia, are neither very profitable nor
very popular. They are not an object of general competition among Vir-
ginia Lawyers; the problem is rather one of an apparent dearth of lawyers
who are willing to undertake such litigation. There has been neither claim
nor proof that any assisted Negro litigants have desired, but have been pre-
vented from retaining, the services of other counsel. We realize that an
N. A. A. C. P. lawyer must derive personal satisfaction from participation
in litigation on behalf of Negro rights, else he would hardly be inclined to
participate at the risk of financial sacrifice."
57 See id. at 441-42: "Objection to the intervention of a lay intermediary,
who may control litigation or otherwise interfere with the rendering of legal
services in a confidential relationship, also derives from the element of pe-
cuniary gain. Fearful of dangers thought to arise from that element, the
courts of several States have sustained regulations aimed at these activities.
We intimate no view one way or the other as to the merits of those deci-
sions with respect to the particular arrangements against which they are
directed."
58 See id. at 444; see also Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,
84 S. Ct. 1113, 1117 (1964). Cf. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524(1960).
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which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has im-
posed.
The N. A. A. C. P. case laid the foundation for the subsequent
Brotherhood decision by overruling state prohibitions of group
legal services on the ground that such prohibitions interfered with
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Freedom of speech
and assembly for the N. A. A. C. P. and its members included the
right to collectively advise its membership of the need for legal
protection and the availability of specified counsel. The burden
of showing that these prerogatives had been abused by the N. A.
A. C. P. or its counsel was placed upon the enforcing state. The
court did not say that this organization or any other organization
could ignore the right and duty of the states to regulate the prac-
tice of law. Surely, such regulation is an important element of
the police powers of the states, since the regulation of legal prac-
tice may well be essential to the maintenance of law itself. In-
stead, state police powers involved in the regulation of profes-
sional legal services must not be used to deny First Amendment
rights where the constitutionally protected rights are real and
substantial while the effect of allegedly improper practice is imag-
ined or inconsequential. It might be said that the Supreme Court
weighed the conflicting interests and found that the allegedly im-
proper conduct by the N. A. A. C. P. involved a lesser evil than
interference with the organization's right to promote its members'
constitutional interests. Thus, the Court apparently denied Vir-
ginia's right to attack this particular form of group legal services
without denying Virginia the right to curb abuses if their effect
could be demonstrated in more than theoretical terms.
The culmination of recent judicial pronouncements on group
legal services was the case of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Virginia.59 The Virginia State Bar had sought and obtained an
injunction against the Brotherhood on the grounds that its plan
constituted solicitation of legal business and unauthorized prac-
tice of law. The trial court found that the Brotherhood's plan re-
sulted in the "channeling of all, or substantially all" prospective
F. E. L. A. claims to lawyers chosen by the Department of Legal
Counsel of the Brotherhood. The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed that order, rejecting contentions by the Brotherhood
that the order abridged its members' rights under the First and
59 377 U. S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1113 (1964).
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Fourteenth Amendments. The federal Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the order contravened the members' rights to free-
dom of speech, petition and assembly.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Black, with
Justice Stewart not participating in the decision, and Justices
Clark and Harlan dissenting. Speaking for the six member major-
ity, Justice Black first reviewed the history of the Brotherhood
itself and its role in the adoption and enforcement of the Federal
Employers Liability Act. The majority opinion briefly outlined the
Brotherhood plan in the following language: 60
Under their plan the United States was divided into sixteen
regions and the Brotherhood selected, on the advice of local
lawyers and federal and state judges, a lawyer or firm in each
region with a reputation for honesty and skill in representing
plaintiffs in railroad personal injury litigation. When a work-
er was injured or killed, the secretary of his local lodge would
go to him or to his widow or children and recommend that
the claim not be settled without first seeing a lawyer, and that
in the Brotherhood's judgment, the best lawyer to consult
was the counsel selected by it for that area.
On the basis of representations by the Brotherhood that their
investigation staff was supplied at the Brotherhood's own expense
and that no sharing of fees between the Brotherhood and the se-
lected counsel was practiced, the Court did not consider the pro-
priety of fee payments by the counsel to the Brotherhood for
investigation services or other purposes.6 1
The guarantees of the First Amendment for free speech,
petition, and assembly were applied to the facts involved as
follows: 62
The right of members to consult with each other in a fraternal
organization necessarily includes the right to select a spokes-
man from their number who could be expected to give the
wisest counsel. That is the role played by the members who
carry out the legal aid program. And the right of the work-
ers personally or through a special department of their Broth-
erhood to advise concerning the need for legal assistance-
and, most importantly, what lawyer a member could con-
fidently rely on-is an inseparable part of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to assist and advise each other.
60 See id. at 84 S. Ct. 1115.
61 See id. at 84 S. Ct. 1116.
62 See id. at 84 S. Ct. 1116.
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The majority opinion in the Brotherhood case, as in the
N. A. A. C. P. case, emphasized the state's right to regulate the
process of law but insisted that such regulation must defer to
personal constitutional rights. Here, the Court said that Virginia
was not truly seeking "to halt ... a commercialization of the legal
profession which might threaten the moral and ethical fabric of
the administration of justice." Concluding that this is not "am-
bulance chasing," the Court referred to the similar practice of
unions in Great Britain and cited the dissenting opinions in the
earlier California Supreme Court decision. 63
While the opinion could be read narrowly to apply only to
organizations seeking to preserve rights of members under federal
laws, the fair intendment of the majority opinion would seem to
go beyond that scope. But the opinion does iterate the power of
the state to challenge this or any other plan of group legal serv-
ices which do in fact produce significant harmful results: 64
In the present case the state again has failed to show any ap-
preciable public interest in preventing the Brotherhood from
carrying out its plan to recommend the lawyers it selects to
represent injured workers.
For these reasons the majority forbade Virginia from interfering
with the members, the Brotherhood or their counsel in carrying
out this "constitutionally protected plan." Therefore, the injunc-
tion was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with the opinion.
The dissenting opinion insists that the decision "relegates the
practice of law to the level of a commercial enterprise," and per-
mits a labor union "to engage in the unauthorized practice of
soliciting personal injury cases from among its membership on
behalf of sixteen regional attorneys .... ,, 65 The dissenters con-
clude that the plan "degrades the profession, proselytes the ap-
proved attorneys to certain required attitudes and contravenes
both the accepted ethics of the profession and the statutory and
judicial rules of acceptable conduct." Rejecting the premise that
only counsel selected by the Brotherhood are competent to assist
the membership, the dissent distinguishes the N. A. A. C. P. case
63 Supra, n. 47.
64 See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 84 S. Ct. 1113, 1117
377 U. S. 1 (1964).
65 Id. at 84 S. Ct. 1118-20.
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on the ground that it involved the protection of political expres-
sion and constitutionally protected civil rights. Justice Clark also
refers to the fee-splitting procedure of the Brotherhood and their
counsel and the failure of the Brotherhood to reform despite its
protestations in previous state court proceedings.
In substance, this dissenting opinion agrees with the lower
court that "gross abuses of channeling and soliciting litigation"
can and should be regulated by the state. The evils envisaged
by the dissenters are "disrepute to the legal profession" and dis-
advantage to the Brotherhood members themselves whose claims
would be represented by select attorneys under the silent con-
trol of the Brotherhood president. Finally, the dissent expressed
fear that the decision will open the flood gates to other groups,
such as automobile associations, to obtain group legal repre-
sentation.66
The Past as Prologue
The majority decision in the Brotherhood case might have
been anticipated. The principle of group legal services has ac-
quired increasing respectability, so that a favorably inclined
court was able to find sufficient justification for its acceptance.
Prominent members of the bar, including at least one judge of
the Supreme Court, had previously expressed approval of group
representation generally. Robert T. McCracken, former presi-
dent of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and former chairman
of the Ethics Committee of the American Bar Association, con-
ducted a survey in 1951 of twenty-five states and ascertained
that legal services were provided by unions for members' private
affairs in six states which considered such practice professionally
proper and commonly accepted.6 7 In two other states, the issue
was considered to be in doubt. A special committee on "Lawyers
and Organized Labor" which functioned as a part of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Survey of the Legal Profession reached
the following conclusion in their 1952 report: 68
66 The two dissenters in the Brotherhood case had likewise dissented for
similar reasons in the N. A. A. C. P. decision. In the N. A. A. C. P. case
they were joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, who did not participate in the
Brotherhood decision.
67 See McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Professional
Standards, 37 Va. L. Rev. 399 (1951).
68 See Report of Committee on Lawyers and Organized Labor, 5 Ind. &
Labor Rel. Rev. 343, 361 (1952).
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More than three quarters of the (labor) lawyers report that
they do personal legal work for union officials, while seven
out of eight labor lawyers state that they do general work
for individual members of the union. Approximately one
quarter of these lawyers report that they are paid for this
work by the union, while the remainder are paid directly by
the individual members of the union.
The work for the individual union member covers a wide
variety of fields.
There seems to be a definite need for education of the union
members, as well as re-interpretation of the Code of Legal
Ethics in this field, to make available to union members
more adequate legal services.
One member of the committee was Arthur J. Goldberg, then
general counsel of the Congress of Industrial Organization, and
now one of the Justices of the Supreme Court. Similar senti-
ments were expressed in a report of the Committee on Legal
Representation of the Section of Labor Relations Law of the
American Bar Association in 1960.69 Significant law review
comment was in accord.
70
Henry S. Drinker, who served for many, many years as chair-
man of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association, likewise appears to have supported these conclusions
in his treatise on legal ethics: 71
A somewhat different although related problem is presented
where a group of persons having a common interest combine
to employ a lawyer to protect or further such interest. If
the group is small and not organized in the form of a club
or association so as to constitute an entity distinct from its
members, the case is evidently not covered by the language
of Canon 35. Thus a partnership may, it would seem, em-
ploy a lawyer on an annual retainer to handle all the legal
problems not only of the firm but of the individual members,
including for example individual income-tax problems, leases
or traffic violations. So, it would seem, might the immediate
69 See Report of Committee on Legal Representation, Section of Labor
Law, American Bar Association, pp. 213-15 (1960).
70 See Note, 46 Ill. L. Rev. 323, 327 (1951); Note, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 244, 247
(1952); Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1374, 1376 (1951); Note, 3 Stanf. L. Rev. 549,
553 (1951); Note, 20 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 85, 97 (1958); Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
1334, 1346 (1959).
71 Drinker, Legal Ethics, 165-67 (1953).
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members of a family employ a family lawyer. It is difficult
to see why the problem is basically different as the group
grows larger or at what point the line should be drawn.
It is not believed that the Canon will prevent the labor
union from finding lawyers to advise their members. The
whole modern tendency is in favor of such arrangements,
including particularly employer and cooperative health serv-
ices, the principles of which, if applied to legal services
would materially lower and spread the total cost to the low-
er income groups. The real argument against their approval
by the bar is believed to be loss of income to the lawyers
and concentration of service in the hands of fewer lawyers.
These features do not commend the profession to the public.
Comparable statements were made by such outstanding leaders
of the legal profession as Professor K. N. Llewellyn of the Co-
lumbia University Law School72 and Professor Lowell Turren-
tine of the Stanford University Law School.73
Within the last five years, the California Bar Association has
repeatedly considered amendments to the rules of ethics which
affect group legal services. Distinguished leaders of the Califor-
nia Bar have taken opposite positions on this question.74 While
the Board of Governors of the Bar Association has recommended
a new rule which would condemn most group representation,
that change has apparently not been adopted.75 However, the
debates on its adoption have brought forward effective advocates
of both positions. In an Ohio disciplinary proceeding discussed
earlier, which arose out of a contract with a truck drivers' union,
the following comments were submitted to the court in the form
of a letter from Dean Roscoe Pound: 7
6
72 See Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures, 5 Law &
Cont. Prob. 104, 120 (1938).
73 See Turrentine, Legal Service for the Lower Income Group, 29 Ore. L.
Rev. 20, 29-30 (1949).
74 See Report of Committee on Group Legal Services, 34 Cal. State Bar J.
318 (1959) (recommending adoption by California of A. B. A. Canon 35);
Report of Committee on Group Legal Services, 35 Cal. State Bar J. 710(1960) (recommending adoption of new California Rule 20).
75 Reports on the debates on Proposed Rule 20 appear at 39 Los Angeles
Metropolitan News, No. 82, pp. 1, 8 (May 25, 1961); id. at No. 83, pp. 1, 8
(May 26, 1961); id. at No. 84, pp. 1, 7 (May 29, 1961).
76 This letter was submitted during oral argument as a supplement to the
brief for the attorneys whose conduct was challenged in Cleveland Bar
Ass'n. v. Fleck, supra at n. 35.
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Our canons of professional ethics were framed many years
ago before the rise of conditions which materially affect the
administration of justice in the courts of today. Since I came
to the Bar in 1890 I have seen many things which at that
time were regarded as doubtful or even unprofessional have
come to be looked at differently. A notable example is the
way which something not unlike advertising in the published
law list has come to be regarded as a matter of course. That
an increasing number of persons injured in industry are
having to be provided for, and that workers in industry are
increasingly members of trade unions which have assumed
increasingly a function of looking after the individual inter-
ests of members, makes it natural that trade unions are in-
teresting themselves in seeing that their members are prop-
erly represented in claims for workmen's compensation.
Under conditions today a reasonable agreement such as that
involved in your case ought not to be in any wise regarded
as objectionable. The truth is that ideas which obtained in
the small rural agricultural community of the beginnings,
in which an aggressive and unscrupulous person could stir
up litigation where otherwise differences would be settled
peaceably, has no application to the conditions involved in
workmen's compensation claims today. The rules of profes-
sional ethics ought to be adjusted to the conditions of today
if necessary, but I take it that leaving them as they stand,
the canons do not involve any legitimate objection to what
was done in your case.
With such revered personages as Dean Pound speaking out in
favor of group legal services, is it surprising that the Supreme
Court in the Brotherhood case by-passed objections based large-
ly on the language of the Canons of Ethics?
One cannot anticipate with any degree of reliability whether
the decision by the Supreme Court in the Brotherhood case will
be given narrow or wide application. In subsequent cases, the
Court may limit its ruling to legal advice and representation on
matters arising under federal law or to legal advice and repre-
sentation on behalf of members of an unincorporated non-profit
association. 77 Both the N. A. A. C. P. and the Brotherhood deci-
sions fall into those two categories. On the other hand, the Court
may use these decisions as a springboard to further expansion
77 One might criticize the Brotherhood and N. A. A. C. P. decisions as
naively giving too great prerogatives to non-profit associations, if the non-
profit character of the organization is critical to the decisions, since non-
profit entities (like profit making entities) are often instrumentalities of the
few individuals who control them.
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of group legal services, even though the subject matter of the
legal advice concerns state law and the organization retaining
the attorney operates for profit. Indeed, it is difficult to justify
any reasonable distinction between profit making and non-profit
organizations who might retain attorneys, where the basis for
denial of state control is the right of the members to act collec-
tively in the selection of counsel. Likewise, the distinction be-
tween protection of rights under federal law and rights under
state law may be more illusory than real, when it is remembered
that the rationale of both recent Supreme Court decisions is the
constitutional protection provided by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
It seems obvious however, that the state bar associations will
continue to resist expansion of group legal services-notwith-
standing the decision in the N. A. A. C. P. and Brotherhood cases.
Almost every state bar association filed a brief as amicus curiae
in support of a petition for re-hearing in the Brotherhood case. 78
Subsequent to the denial of that re-hearing, various spokesmen
for the organized bar have repeated their intention to resist the
effect of the Brotherhood case and any expansion of its mean-
ing.79 It appears that an attorney who embarks boldly upon
active group representation may do so at his own peril, since
some leaders of the bar have vowed to combat this movement
with disciplinary proceedings.
Despite these uncertainties, there is reason to presume that
group legal services will be commonplace over a broad spectrum
of activities in the not too distant future. Whether this will be
accomplished by modification of the Canons of Ethics in response
to constitutional decisions, or by social pressures which lead to
different interpretation of the present Canons, is a matter of
speculation. It does not seem likely that the legal profession can
indefinitely resist the movement that has encompassed other pro-
fessional activities in this country and has already caused equiv-
alent changes in other countries. Perhaps a more realistic target
78 The A. B. A. was granted leave to file its brief as amicus curiae, and the
rehearing was denied, on June 1, 1964 (84 Sup. Ct. 1625).
79 See, e.g., 9 American Bar News, No. 9, p. 4 (Aug. 15, 1964) (remarks of
Walter E. Craig, retiring president of the A. B. A.). Informal opinions of
the Ethics Committee subsequent to the Brotherhood ruling have con-
demned various group practices. See Opinions C-687 and C-699. 50 A. B. A.
J. 829 (Sept. 1964). See also The Brotherhood Case (Editorial), 50 A. B. A.
J. 841 (Sept. 1964).
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for the bar is the curb of abuses arising from group legal serv-
ices, rather than a blanket objection to the concept itself.
It is manifestly undesirable for any official of an organized
group to control the group's attorney, so as to eliminate a true
professional relationship between that attorney and the group
member. But this may not be a necessary consequence of group
representation. If, for example, emphasis were placed upon the
primary duty of the group attorney to the individual members,
the "control" circumstances would be no more objectionable than
the familiar referral of bank customers to an attorney by a bank
executive. The desire of an attorney to ingratiate himself with
the group leader is no more disturbing than the equivalent hopes
of an attorney dealing with any responsible community leader
who can be expected to refer clients.80 An attorney who permits
a real conflict of interest without full disclosure can and should
run the risk of disciplinary repercussions. The use of group legal
services as a means for blatant advertising and solicitation could
be curbed by insisting that the organization publish only the
availability of competent counsel without identifying that attor-
ney in mass mailings or other mass communication media. Com-
plete fiscal and operational independence of the group's attorney
from the group itself would reduce the likelihood of any signifi-
cant efforts by the group itself to practice law, and mitigate the
objection to the activity as an unauthorized practice of law by
non-legal organizations. And, the broader objection to group
legal services, as encouraging commercialism in the practice of
law, would have to be met by diligent efforts of the bar to en-
force adherence to dignified professional behavior.
The above discussion is not intended to suggest that group
legal services will be accepted without trauma to the profession.
Rather, we may conclude that it will come to be common prac-
tice whether we now approve it or not, that it does have some
socially desirable features, and that its greatest abuses are at
least partly subject to control. Such control will not be simple
to accomplish, but early attention to its formulation is an appro-
priate matter for the careful consideration of all attorneys.
80 The same regrettable economic pressures can and do induce counsel to
seek substantial corporate retainers from whom they expect to obtain a
steady flow of business. The manner in which such retainers are pursued
and not the retainers themselves is potentially objectionable.
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